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The Macroeconomic Context
Kenya's is an open trading economy (exports plus
imports were the equivalent of 70 per cent of GNP in
1970) and therefore heavily influenced by conditions
over which the country has no control. The major net
exports are overwhelmingly agricultural; little diversi-
fication has occurred over the past 30 years.
Internally, Kenya operates a comparatively free
market, but with heavy government involvement in
many activities. Key functions, including the marketing
of basic foods, are at least partly carried out by
parastatals. The government 'owns shares in textiles,
shoes, sugar, tyres, alcohol, pharmaceuticals, canning,
mining salt, drilling, paper, hotels, cement, batteries,
vehicles, radios, fishing, engineering, beverages and
food processing' [Kenya Government 19821.
The 1976/77 coffee boom caused the values of the
main export to rise from $US 107 mn in 1975 to
US$494 mn in 1977, and led government to undertake
an ambitious programme of development expenditure
and, on the implicit but false assumption that these
high revenues would be sustained, to increase
recurrent spending by means which included a decreed
10 per cent rise in public-sector employment in 1979.
Kenya therefore had far to fall as a result of the
1979-8 1 oil price rise and the international recession.
Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford. The study on which this paper is
based was carried out n 1983 in conjunction with Paul Mosley,
University of Bath.
The study set Out to assess the effectiveness of official multilateral
and bilateral aid to Kenya over the past 10 years, using the criteria of
economic growth and the alleviation of poverty. lt was based on a
visit to Kenya of 3-4 weeks in 1984, during which time interviews
were held with senior officials of relevant ministries, with the
resident staff of major donors, and with field staff ofsome projects.
Visits were also made to the headquarters of most major donors in
Europe and North America. Cooperation from Government and
donors was good in almost all cases.
The many documents consulted, both internal and unrestricted,
included those of the Kenya Government. together with many
project papers and evaluation documents, and the country analyses
prepared by several of the bigger donors.
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By 1980 both balance-of-payments deficit and budget
deficit were over 10 per cent of GNP. Government's
response was two-fold.
First, there was heavy external borrowing, together
with higher indirect taxes and interest rates, and
devaluations over three years amounting to almost
50 per cent against the SDR. Commercial foreign
borrowing rose tenfold from 1976 to 1982, and Kenya
negotiated four agreements with the IMF between
1979 to 1983. Development expenditures were cut
sharply in 1982-83 (by about one-third in real terms).
There were marked improvements in both the
balance-of-payments and the budget deficit, the latter
falling to a provisional three per cent of GNP in 1983-
84. But the debt service ratio rose to over 20 per cent.
Second, the government tried to use its resources more
efficiently. In 1982 it set up the high-level Ndegwa
Committee [Kenya Government 1982] which alleged
over-extension of government, poor public sector
management, and financial indiscipline. Government
has taken some steps to implement its recom-
mendations, eg on privatising some public sector
activities and decentralising planning and budgeting;
but progress overall has been slow.
The role of aid in helping the economy to weather its
difficulties over this period can hardly be overstated.
External grants and loans rose from 39.9 per cent of
government development expenditure in 1979-80 to
84.8 per cent in 1982-83. Particularly significant in
allowing even modest growth to be sustained has been
the increased balance-of-payments support (see
below).
Kenya faces a difficult medium term. The agricultural
sector will be crucial in employing and feeding most of
the rapidly growing population, and as a principal
foreign-exchange earner. But the easy options for
raising agricultural value (spare land of medium to
good potential, added scope for switching to higher-
value field crops) are by and large used up; and the
international price prospects for the major exports, tea
and coffee, are for medium-term stagnation or even
decline. Progress in future will depend on policies and
institutions that support intensification of production
and broad-based generation of incomes.
The single most critical issue is likely to be the
distribution of land. Evidence from Kenya's Integrated
Rural Surveys shows that, analysed separately over
the seven main ecological zones in which crop farming
is widespread, holdings of less than 0.5 ha. produce on
average a massively higher value per unit area, and use
massively more labour (in each case by a factor of 20 to
30), than holdings of over 8 ha.2 Such data should be
interpreted with caution (even within each zone,
ecological variations may account for part of the
differences; and some enterprises, such as breeding
improved stock, do not lend themselves readily to
small-scale operation). But Kenya's population,
currently growing at around four per cent pa, is
unlikely to be fed or employed unless - through
legislation, political change, or the development of a
more effective rental market in land - larger
agricultural units are subdivided.3
Aid and Donor Coordination
Kenya is Africa's third biggest aid recipient (after
Sudan and Tanzania) with US$472 mn Overseas
Development Assistace (ODA) in 1982. There are
about 48 multilateral and bilateral donors (including
UN technical agencies, but excluding NGO5) diverse
in priorities and procedures, although some 85 per cent
of aid comes from the top 10. The World Bank
(including IBRD funds which, while not counting as
ODA, incorporate a concessional element) is the
largest single donor and has a unique role in
undertaking country and sector analysis. Although
they share broadly developmental objectives, donors'
motives (as in other recipient countries) are a mix of
commercial, geo-political, bureaucratic and
humanitarian, the relative importance of these varying
by donor. In addition Kenya is an important test for
an open-economy model of development.
The diversity of donors is a useful source of ideas
where much remains to be learned about what is
effective; but there is also a negative side. The plethora
of funds confuses planning and budgeting, introduces
2 The dominant importance of holding size is underlined in several
papers, including Tidnck (1979); Livingstone (1981); and Hunt
(1984).
Data on the current distribution of land by holding size are rather
unsatisfactory. Farms of over 20 ha. may account for a little over
half of the total arable area, although this is open to question given
unrecorded changes in ownership and farm size over the past
decade.
different procedures for aid management (including
procurement and disbursement), and worsens the
tendency of aid-tying to multiply types of equipment
and to exacerbate training and maintenance problems.
Thus there were reported to be 18 different makes of
water pump in use, many supplied by aid. Some of
these negative effects would be neutralised by effective
coordination procedures, but the record of both
government and donors in this respect is poor. There
has been no effective mechanism for encapsulating the
aggregate effect of about 600 projects [UNDP 1983],
all of which compete for counterpart finance,
manpower and administrative capacity. As a result
many, perhaps most, projects suffer from lack of key
counterpart contributions.
There were reportedly two short-lived efforts during
the 1970s to set up an aid coordinating mechanism,
and in 1984 there was a promising initiative arising
from the Consultative Group, involving sectoral
committees chaired by government and attended by
interested donors. The future of the effort, however,
remains in the balance. Effective coordination
demands a constant effort, and it runs counter to the
immediate interests of some participants: sectoral
ministries want to notch up as many projects as
possible; donors pursuing commercial interest tend to
break ranks; and individual donor officials have 'pet'
projects. Still, effective aid coordination is possible; in
Kenya the disadvantages of the multiplicity of donors
and projects whose aggregate effect is not necessarily
tailored to the needs of the country will persist until an
effective aid management system is in place. This will
not happen until the Kenya government decides to
take and sustain the initiative. This has not yet
happened.
The Shift to Programme Aid and Policy
Dialogue
Aid goes mainly to agriculture (an estimated 22.8 per
cent of commitments in 1982), transport (22.3 per cent),
non-project (programme) aid (11.0 per cent), and
water and education (8.0 per cent each) UNDP 19831.
The most significant trend in recent years has been the
growth, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in
the proportion being committed as non-project aid
(for the UK from 16 per cent in 1972 to 26 per cent in
1983; for the US from 32 per cent toSO per cent; for the
Netherlands from 14 per cent to 25 per cent; and for
Sweden from 4 per cent to 12 per cent). This has
happened for three main reasons. First, at a time of
stringency, maintenance of existing investments
received higher priority over embarking on new ones;
thus most donors responded to government's
budgetary problems by shifting aid towards recurrent
costs, not only through programme aid, but also
through blurring the capital-recùrrent distinction by,
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for instance, covering recurrent costs in subsequent
project phases. Second, donors came to feel that the
limit of the Kenyan public sector effectively to manage
more projects had been reached. Third, several major
donors (including the US, UK, and World Bank) had
come to the view that institutional and policy reforms
were crucial to sustained economic performance and
to effective project implementation, and that only
programme aid could provide the necessary leverage.
Conditionality is not new. Conditions have always
been attached to project aid, normally specific to
implementation of the project, but occasionally
sectoral when associated with large projects (eg a
condition of the Second Livestock Project in Kenya
was that government would remove all price controls
on meat). And Kenya has experience of ¡MF
conditionality. But what is new is the intensity and
range of conditions that have been attached to aid in
1981-5. The most significant elements of programme
aid recently have been the two Structural Adjustment
Loans (SALs) of the World Bank, significant not only
for their size ($US 185.9 mn, fully disbursed between
1980 and 1984), but also because the policy conditions
to some extent set the agenda for other donors too.
Thus US and UK programme aid was contingent on
Kenya and the World Bank agreeing on the SALs.
The SAL conditions sought to liberalise trade
internally (most importantly the grain trade during
SAL II) and externally (replacing import quotas with
tariffs and reducing the effective rate of protection),
and to promote non-traditional exports. There were
also modest conditions concerned with strengthening
national population policy and addressing land issues.
All these conditions were consistent with previous
Kenya Government statements of policy, and - more
than previous project conditions, or ¡MF macro-
conditionality - addressed the broad economic
framework, so that the link was less explicit between
the conditions and the variables (economic growth in
particular) they were intended to influence.
The record of implementation of the SALs in Kenya
reflects a lesson that emerges from donors' experience
in other countries too, namely that aid is often
ineffective in bringing about a sustained change of
policy to which the recipient government (or
influential elements within it) is not already
committed, but that it can be more effective if it is
helping to underwrite the costs of difficult change to
which the recipient is favourably predisposed Cassen
1986]. Thus in Kenya, although most of the changes
proposed under SAL were nominally already policy,
in fact in key respects (eg grain marketing and
imports) important interests were not committed to
the liberalisation envisaged under the SAL and policy
did not change significantly. These interests included
74
provincial and district officials in food surplus areas
who valued the power to keep food prices low locally,
as well as private individuals engaged in trading grain
who benefited from price differentials. For some
measures (eg import liberalisation and population)
government took the steps necessary to comply with
the lettçr of the agreements (reducing reliance on
import quotas, setting up a population council) but
avoided substantive change (protection remained
high). The lesson from Kenya is that donors should
not underestimate the obstacles to influencing policy
through direct leverage.
Some Sectoral Experience with Project Aid
The Kenya study could not cover all sectors and
projects. But evaluations of numerous projects were
reviewed, and both authors had independent
knowledge of some projects. Projects in five sectors
were included in the study - agriculture, transport,
energy, rural water, and population. The record is
mixed; whereas up to about the mid-1970s Kenya had
the reputation among donors of making as effective a
use of aid funds as any other country in Africa, the
performance worsened rapidly and by the early 1980s
aid projects in Kenya had a bad record.
Such a conclusion inevitably has strong subjective and
unquantified elements. There are two important gaps
in the evaluation material. First, few projects
(exceptions being the Rural Access Roads Programme
- see below - and some rural water projects) are
evaluated for impact on low-income groups; thus we
could not reach conclusions as to the direct impact of
aid on poverty. Probably, some initiatives (the Rural
Access Roads Programmes, hybrid maize varieties
which were widely adopted by small farmers) had
beneficial effects on some low-income groups, if not
the poorest; but in some cases (eg in the sugar industry,
or rural water) less capital-intensive technologies
might have generated incomes or provided services
more widely.
Second, the paucity of 'impact studies', which assess
projects some years after donor support ends, means
that long-term effects are incompletely known. But the
government's difficulty in providing for recurrent
costs, together with the fragmentary evidence that
many projects in Kenya are not sustained [see the
Introduction to this Bulletin), underpin current donor
concern with this topic.
In agriculture there have been successes, many
associated with initiatives of the l950s and 1960s, and
reflecting the fortunes of the sector as a whole -
growth of 4.6 per cent pa from 1963-72, 2 per cent from
1972-77, and sharp fluctuations thereafter [World
Bank 1984]. Successes include support for smaliholder
agriculture through extending hybrid maize, for the
Kenya Tea Development Authority (with some
130,000 smallholder growers), and for smaliholder
coffee production. But the ambitious, multi-com-
ponent national rural development and livestock
projects begun in the early to mid-1970s ran into
difficulties, in part associated with their scale and
institutional complexity (in particular their demands
upon inter-ministry coordination). The evaluation
reports on these projects in the early 1980s found low
or negative returns, and little success in institution-
building. No more projects of this type are envisaged.
Another set of 10 multi-sector projects, covering 13
districts, grouped under the Arid and Semi-arid Lands
(ASAL) programme, have had mixed results. In part,
their difficulties arise because low and unreliable
rainfall makes investment risky and high-input
farming precarious. But institutionally they have done
better than the national integrated projects, largely
because inter-sector coordination is more readily
achievable at the district than at the national level. If
the momentum of decentralising planning and
budgeting to the districts is kept up, this model should
be increasingly relevant. But these projects (typically
involving roads, health, agriculture, livestock) do still
need national inter-sectoral direction. Experience has
shown that this cannot be achieved if the 'parent'
ministry is sector-specific; it must in effect be the
Office of the President or the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning, even at the risk of these projects
being given a low priority at senior levels.
The disappointing record of many agricultural
projects has led in two directions. There are fewer
projects in the pipeline, especially for the public sector
(USAID, for instance, was envisaging only one, in
research). And the new projects are organisationally
simpler - eg the World Bank's National Extension
Project, a follow-up to the unsuccessful Second
Integrated Agricultural Development Project.
In the energy sector, there is a striking discrepancy:
some 90 per cent of donor funds for the sector are used
for commercial energy sources [UNDP 1983] which
account for only 21 per cent of final demand for
energy, the bulk of which is met from charcoal,
fuelwood, and crop wastes [Beijer Institute 1984].
Thus the needs of low-income groups in particular are
being neglected. Partly as a result of this, Kenya faces
an ecological crisis by the end of the century [Beijer
Institute 1984: 177]. Nevertheless, aid interventions in
commercial energy have been beneficial. Through
farsighted programmes, the only increase in electricity
generation has been an 11.9 per cent annual increase
since 1975 in hydro-electrical capacity [CIDA 1984],
apart from a promising geo-thermal scheme. But for
this, the already heavy burden of liquid fuel imports
(58 per cent of non-petroleum exports in 1982) would
have been worse.
We did not comprehensively review aid for the
transport sector, but did look at an innovative and
effective Rural Access Roads Programme (RARP).
Starting in 1970, the roads component of the Special
Rural Development Programme tested capital- and
labour-intensive methods of rural road construction;
the latter were found to be fairly successful. They were
therefore incorporated into the RARP, supported by
six donors, and coordinated by a relatively effective
ministry, from the mid-1970s covering 23 districts
(over half the total). A labour-intensive maintenance
system was added later, and by 1983 some 7,000 km
had been constructed and 3,000 km gravelled.
Evaluation studies, although not complete, indicate
beneficial income generation and distribution effects,
and a reduction in long-term out-migration [Kenya
Government 1983]. The RARP is not typical of funds
spent on transport, which may in total be too large
relative to other sectors, and in nature too capital-
intensive. But the RARP does point up lessons for
designing and managing transport projects.
Rural water, by contrast, is a less good advertisement
for aid. The sector absorbed 9 per cent of all aid in
1965-84; yet at least 89 per cent of the rural population
still lacks access to a protected water supply. The
problem arises from inappropriate high-cost techno-
logy with excessive capital intensity; too little
provision for maintenance; interrupted supplies of
fuel; and political pressures governing the location of
schemes. Donors have disagreed on the best method
for charging, and cost-recovery is low; about 60 per
cent of consumers are unmetered, and pay for about
15 per cent of the total cost of water. By contrast with
rural roads, the ministry is less effective, and there has
been much less sustained testing of alternative
approaches, let alone implementation of those proved
to work.
As for population activities, these absorbed only
3.2 per cent of total aid to Kenya between 1974 and
1983 - in striking contrast to the donors' conviction
that Kenya's 4 per cent rate of growth of population is
its main problem. But this aid seems to have been well
used. Donors have generally coordinated well, have
assisted constructively in the formulation of policy,
but have kept a low profile, and have funded fairly
effective delivery systems. But population growth has
not yet started to slow down; much more needs to be
done.
The explanation for the small proportion of aid for the
purpose is largely that the Kenya government did not
ask for such help until 1974 and even then on a very
modest scale. Only after the change of leadership was
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there a national political commitment to slower
population growth, and even this is not universally
shared by politicians. The main problem is not lack of
demand for family planning services. In Kenya, as in
many other primarily agricultural Ide's there is good
reason for many people to prefer large families, as is
borne out by national survey data. But discussions
with government and donor officials, confirmed by a
visit by one of us [Mosleyl to a clinic offering family
planning services, indicated that there is unmet
demand. A good use of more aid funds would be an
expanded public information programme.
Overall, our (incomplete) review of sectors indicated a
need for a continuing learning process, involving both
donors and the government, on what works and what
doesn't, and on how to manage aid effectively.
Conclusions
Inevitably, in view of the diversity of aid to Kenya, we
cannot put a figure on 'how much works'. Since
independence, important social indicators (life
expectancy, literacy) have shown an improvement;
and aid funds and technical assistance have played a
role in this, Nevertheless, extensive poverty and
undernutrition show no sign of disappearing. And
many aid-supported interventions fail.
Why does a significant proportion of projects in all
sectors fall short of what was expected? First, the
financial crisis of the early 1980s and the drastic cuts in
development expenditure devastated project imple-
mentation; lacking an effective national aid manage-
ment and budgeting system (a deficiency since being
addressed by government with donor support),
government did not rank projects in order of priority,
and cuts were therefore made across the board,
sometimes by eliminating crucial items. Second, as the
Ndegwa Committee found, the efficiency of the
administration in Kenya has fallen. Third, aid
coordination is poor; there are discrepancies between
the uses of aid funds and the needs of the economy,
especially of low-income groups. Fourth, both donors
and the recipient government have shown themselves
to be fairly indifferent to the needs of the very poor,
subscribing, if to any approach, to an attenuated
version of 'trickle-down'.
Fifth, donors have been unrealistic in drawing up their
policy prescriptions; these should not only be
appropriately designed in detail for Kenya's needs, but
should also contribute to a constructive relationship,
rather than to confrontation, between donor and
recipient. In particular, donors need to improve the
policy dialogue by building up the Kenya Govern-
ment's capacity for planning and policy analysis.
Some support of this kind is being given, for instance
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through the multi-donor institutional projects in the
Treasury and Ministry of Agriculture; but many other
projects should give more weight to building
capacities, even at the expense of short-term
achievements. Finally, donors should minimise the
influence of the non-developmental aims of their aid
programmes; in particular, even if they cannot do
away with aid tying, they need to reduce the
consequent distortions.
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